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UTAH SUMO/IE COURT 
IN THiS SUFKifciyUi CUUKT UF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JERRY DUGGER, dba J & D 
ENTERPRISES, 
Respondent - Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PAUL J. COX, COX CORPORATION, 
a Utah corporation, SALT LAKE 
COUNTY TREASURER, JOSEPH A. 
MOLLERUP, iMcGHIE LAND TITLE 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
CLIVE M. MAXWELL dba C. M. 
MAXWELL ELECTRIC COMPANY, and 
HERB TOWERS MURRAY PLUMBING 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Appellants - Defendants. 
Case No. 14395 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involved a lien foreclosure action against 
real property and a claim for wages by the defendant Dugger, 
dba J & D Enterprises (hereinafter called "Dugger"), against 
Cox Corporation, the owner of the property, and Paul J. Cox 
as an individual (hereinafter called "Cox"). The subject 
JUL Z~ 'i^ 'S 
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property being located at 1342 South State Street, in the 
City and County of Salt Lake, State of Utah. 
Other defendants claiming liens against said property 
were <alsp named in said action, as follows: 
1. Clive Maxwell, for and in behalf of C. M. 
Maxwell Electric Company (hereinafter called 
• "Maxwell"), in the amount of $2,342.00. 
2. Herb Towers Murray Plumbing (hereinafter 
called "Towers"), in the amount of $3,172.33. 
Plaintiff Duggerfs lien claim was for $33,407.93, 
said sum including both of the foregoing liens. 
Service Station Supply (hereinafter called "Station") 
filed a separate action bearing Civil No. 215255 in the same 
Court, which was consolidated with this action, but no lien 
was filed. Service Station Supply's claim of $678.98 was, 
however, included in plaintiff Dugger's total lien claim 
of $33,407.93. 
Defendant Mollerup, the first mortgage holder, as 
well as defendants Salt Lake County Treasurer and McGhie 
Land Title Company were all allowed to withdraw from this 
case after all parties stipulated that their claims were 
prior to the claims of all of the remaining parties. 
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Cox filed a Counterclaim in this action against 
Dugger for physical damages caused to the subject property 
for $50/000.00/ plus punitive damages in the amount of 
$150/000-00. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court entered a "personal judgment" 
against Cox and in favor of Dugger, and defendants Towers, 
Maxwell and Station. The court failed to rule on Cox's 
Counterclaim. 
In addition to the "personal judgment" the lower 
court further granted Dugger, Towers and Maxwell a lien 
against the subject property and ordered the lien fore-
closed and the subject property sold at Sheriff's Sale. 
The lower court refused Dugger's claim for wages. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
On appeal Cox seeks reversal of the lower court's 
"personal judgment" against Cox and an order declaring the 
lien against the subject property void and restoring said 
subject property to Cox. 
In the alternative/ Cox seeks to have the judgment 
amount reduced so as to conform to the evidence submitted 
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at trial and to have the Counterclaim remanded to the 
lower court for a new trial• 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
i * .
 % 
The subject property was at all times herein men-
tioned leased by Cox to Dynatek Corp. (hereinafter called 
"Dynatek"), pursuant to a written lease. Commencing in 
December/ 1971/ and continuing on through the 19th day of 
July, 1972/ during all of which time said subject property 
was leased to Dynatek, Dugger claims that he was the agent 
of Cox and had authority to act for Cox with regard to the 
subject property. Dugger claims that pursuant to said 
authority he performed certain services and arranged for 
third parties to furnish material and services/ and in 
general organized and managed the repair work being con-
ducted during the aforesaid period at the subject property. 
Dugger claims compensation for said services as an employee 
or agent for wages earned during said period of $1,000.00 
per month plus expenses. In addition thereto, Dugger 
claims that he should be reimbursed for any charges in-
curred by him which relate to the subject property during 
said period of time wherein any company, person, partner-
ship, corporation or other entity furnished materials or 
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labor at the request of Dugger for the subject property. 
Dugger does not claim any written contract with Cox, but 
claims the arrangement was oral. 
Dugger further claims that Cox failed and refused 
to compensate him in the amount of $1,000.00 per month as 
provided for by the alleged oral agreement and that Cox 
failed and refused to reimburse him for his expenses in-
curred with regard to the subject property and that the 
said Cox failed and refused to reimburse said Dugger for 
the bills and/or charges incurred by said Dugger in the 
favor of various third parties, including the other 
defendants herein, with regard to furnishing services, 
materials and miscellaneous supplies to the subject pro-
perty and as a result of said failures Dugger did, on or 
about the 19th day of July, 1972, cause to be filed 
against the subject property a mechanics lien in the 
amount of $33,407.93, claiming that said amount included 
all other creditors1 claims for services, labor, materials 
and/or supplies furnished for the benefit of the subject 
property. Dugger claims wages for six months totalling 
$6,000.00, which he claimed at trial were included as 
part of the lien. 
In addition to the lien claimed by Dugger, addi-
tional liens were filed against the subject property by 
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Maxwell for $3,042.00, the same being filed on or about 
the 10th day of May, 1972, and Towers for $3,172.00, said 
lien being filed on or about the 30th day of June, 1972; 
both of said liens, however, were included in Duggers 
total lien. 
In addition to the aforesaid claims against the 
subject property, Station was allowed to join the case 
and make a claim for judgment against Cox in the amount 
of $678.98. Station, however, did not file a lien against 
the subject property and Dugger did not file a lien in 
behalf of Station. 
In addition to the foregoing Dugger claims that 
the subject property was substantially improved by his 
efforts and that to allow Cox to take advantage of said 
improvements without paying therefor would unjustly enrich 
Cox. 
Cox denies any agency agreement with Dugger, and 
therefore claims that Dugger has no authority whatsoever 
to obligate the subject property for Cox, thus making the 
lien filed by Dugger invalid. 
Cox further claims that the lien is invalid for 
the further reason that it incorrectly described the 
subject property, that it co-mingled items which cannot 
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be a subject of a lien with the lien figure, and that 
the amount of the lien was in excess of the actual debts 
claimed to be due and owing against said property as 
shown by Dugger's proof at trial. 
Cox claimed damages against Dugger for filing a 
lien against its property thus encumbering the subject 
property and resulting in the curtailment of Cox's 
borrowing power so that it could not continue with its 
program of development for properties located at 2500 
South State Street and properties located at Beck Street, 
both said properties being owned by Cox. Cox further 
claims physical damages to property against Dugger. The 
total damages claimed by Cox is $51,750.00. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE WILL NOT SUPPORT THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING 
THAT DUGGER WAS AGENT FOR COX AND SAID COURT ERRED IN SO 
FINDING. 
Agency. 
"Agency is ordinarily a relation created by 
agreement of the parties, and as between the 
principal and agent, an agency is created and 
authority is actually conferred very much as 
a contract is made, to the extent that the 
creation results from the agreement between the 
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principal and agent that such a relation shall 
exist• As between the parties to the relation, 
there must be a meeting of the minds in esta-
blishing the agency, and the consent of both 
the principal and the agent is necessary to 
create the agency, . . . the principal must 
intend that the agent shall act for him, . . . 
and the intention of the parties must find 
expression either in words or conduct between 
them." (Emphasis added) 
(3 AmJur 2nd, Sec. 17, P.428) 
" . . . and whether an agency has in fact been 
created is to be determined by the relations 
of the parties as they exist under their agree-
ment or acts, with the question being ultimately 
one of intention. The question is to be deter-
mined by the fact that one represents and is 
acting for another, and not by the consideration 
that it will be inconvenient or unjust if he is 
not held to be the agent of such other . . . " 
(Emphasis added) (3 AmJur 2nd, Sec. 21, P 430-31) 
In the instant case Dugger testified that he was 
neither the agent of Cox nor an employee. (See P. 215, 
lines 7 thru 11 of transcript) 
Don Hall testified that Dugger and witness Curtiss 
Johnson, the President of Dynatek, the lessee of the subject 
property, had offices in the building located on the subject 
property (P.291, lines 7-30), and that Dugger's and Johnson's 
desks were side-by-side and that Dugger asked Hall to do 
the work on the subject property for Dugger and Dynatek, 
not Dugger and Cox. That Hall would not do the work for 
Cox because of advice from his employer, and Johnson, not 
Cox, paid for Hall's work. (See Hall's testimony, P.288, 
lines 3-6) 
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Consider further the testimony of other witnesses 
who were creditors of Dugger and/or Dynatek that were 
called by Dugger to testify for and in his behalf to the 
effect that none of the said witnesses ever dealt with Cox, 
nor did they expect him to pay the bill. (See P.27, lines 
27-30, P.28, lines 1-30, P.29, lines 16-22) That some 
of the creditors did not even know Cox nor did they at 
the time the debt was incurred expect Cox to pay the 
respective debts due them, but said creditors testified 
that they expected Dynatek and/or Dugger to pay to the 
debts incurred, and that Dugger was working for Dynatek. 
(See P.35, lines 27-30, P.36, lines 3-6) The creditors 
further testified that Dugger never once told them who 
owned said property, nor did Dugger ever charge anything 
which was delivered to said property in the name of Cox. 
Dugger did, however, on numerous occasions charge items in 
the name of Dynatek, the owner of the leasehold interest 
and Dugger also charged items in the name of J & D Enter-
prises and Jerry Dugger personally. (See P.66, lines 8-11, 
P.72, lines 6-10, P.80, lines 17-30, P.81, lines 1-3, P.82, 
lines 19-23, P.83, lines 5-14, P.96, lines 14-25, P.107, 
lines 9-17, P.112, lines 4-30, P.113, lines 1-8, P.115, 
lines 2-24, P.118, line 19-23, P.125, lines 4-30, and 
P.126, line 1.) 
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Dugger produced no evidence to show that any of 
the creditors relied upon the testimony regarding agency 
as related by Turner and Johnson, both interested parties, 
or that the creditors ever had knowledge of said conversa-
tions and neither Johnson nor Turner were creditors. No 
evidence was introduced by Dugger that any of the creditors 
relied on the testimony of Woolas A. Macey regarding the 
relationship between Dugger and Cox, which Cox denied. 
It would seem logical that if Dugger was in fact 
Cox's agent that he would have at least once during all 
of these transactions charged something in the name of 
Cox, but he cannot offer one instance in which this 
happened. Neither did Dugger offer any evidence to show 
that the alleged agency agreement was to be that of an 
undisclosed principal or employer nature. 
I would further point out that none of these creditors 
ever dealt with Cox previously by and through Dugger. Neither 
had the majority of said creditors ever dealt directly with 
Cox. Therefore, it can hardly be'said that Cox had clothed 
Dugger with ostensible authority to act for Cox Corporation 
or Paul J. Cox by reason of past actions, thereby creating 
an agency relationship. 
A check introduced into evidence by defendant Cox 
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from a finance company in the amount of $10,000 further 
indicates that Dugger was in fact Johnson's agent, and 
they were working together to purchase the first mortgage 
on the subject property from one Mollerup, and in fact 
Dugger and Johnson were ultimately successful in bringing 
about a purchase of the first mortgage from Mollerup by 
one Beesley, and immediately after the same was purchased 
by Beesley the same was assigned to Zions First National 
Bank and a foreclosure action was commenced to foreclose 
Cox's interest out of the property. The court can take 
judicial notice of said action being filed as Civil No. 
215226 in the above entitled district court. 
Cox testified that he did in fact authorize certain 
acts to be done by Dugger, to-wit: moving an old house, 
which was not located on the subject property but on a 
lot just north of said subject property, purchase doors 
for the car wash, and some carpenter work. Cox testified 
that he did in fact pay Dugger for all of said work performed. 
The evidence further shows that these three items are the 
only items which Dugger ever billed Cox for, thus negating 
the attempted inference by Dugger that he had authority to 
do other acts for Cox. Dugger failed to produce one shred 
of written evidence to indicate that from January 1, 1972, 
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through July 7, 1972, that he had made any demand for 
payment upon Cox, except for the items just mentioned 
above. Neither did Dugger, prior to said time, ever 
furnish Cox with an accounting of the bills against said 
property and, in fact, no completed accounting was pro-
duced at trial, and then Dugger could not testify as 
to what was owed him. (See P.194, lines 11-17) 
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POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT GRANTED "A PERSONAL 
JUDGMENT" AGAINST COX AND IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF ON 
THE THEORY OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT. 
Acting officiously also applies to the claim made 
by Dugger that Cox was unjustly enriched by reason of the 
acts of Dugger and the other Plaintiff creditors. In 66 
Am. Jur. 2nd, Sec. 5, p. 948, entitled "Restitution and 
Implied Contracts", wherein the subject of officious acts 
are discussed, the following is stated: 
"A basic principal underlying the rules in regard 
to restitution (funjust enrichment1) is that a 
person who officiously confers a benefit upon 
another is not entitled to restitution therefor. 
Officiousness means interference in the affairs 
of others not justified by the circumstances 
under which the interference takes place. Policy 
ordinarily requires that a person who has confer-
red a benefit either by way of giving another 
services, or by adding to the value of his land, 
or by paying his debt, or even by transferring 
property to him should not be permitted to re-
quire the other to pay therefor, unless the one 
conferring the benefit had a valid reason for so 
doing. Where a person has officiously conferred 
a benefit upon another, the other is enriched but 
is not considered to be unjustly enriched. The 
rule denying restitution to officious persons has 
the effect of penalizing those who thrust benefits 
upon others and protecting persons who have had 
benefits thrust upon them. 
One has a right to decline to permit another to 
perform an act on his account. A party is not 
liable quasi ex contractu for benefits forced 
upon him. Where there was no request for what 
the Plaintiff did, the fact that drawn out nego-
tiations were unsuccessful because the parties 
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In order for Dugger to collect under a theory of 
restitution or unjust enrichment for wages or services 
performed there must have been no agreement in the first 
instance and here according to Dugger f s own testimony, he 
claims that there was an oral agreement to pay, thus he 
must be bound by that testimony and cannot claim a right 
of recover under a theory of restitution, but must rely 
upon his alleged agency relationship which did not exist. 
66 Am. Jur. 2nd, Sec. .11, p. 952, states that: 
11
. . .the doctrine of unjust enrichment or re-
covery in quasi contract applies to situations 
where there is no legal contract but where the 
person sought to be charged is in possession 
of money or property which in good conscience 
and justice he should not retain but should 
deliver to another, the courts imposing a 
duty to refund the money or the use value 
of the property to the person whom in good 
conscience it ought to belong." 
In the instant case all creditors, including Dugger, 
claimed against Cox that there was a legal and binding 
contract. Neither does Dugger or any of the other creditors 
claim or plea that there was not an existing contract, thus 
under the law applying to unjust enrichment they cannot 
recover. 
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did not agree on a price affords no basis for 
imposing a quasi-contractual liability on the 
Defendant in such case, the Plaintiff occupies 
the position of a volunteer." 
(Gould v American Water Works Service Co., 52 
NJ 226, 245 A2d 14 (citing Restatement, Resti-
tution, Sees. 2, 41, 112)). Mehl v Norton, 201 
l
* Minn 203, 275 NW 843, 113 ALR 1055). (Restate-
ment, Restitution, Sec. 2 Comment a; Section 
112, Comment a). 
In 66 Am. Jur. 2nd, Sec. 23, entitled "Restitution 
and Implied Contracts", it states as follows: 
"Ordinarily the law imposes liability to pay 
for services rendered by another only when 
the person for whose benefit they were render-
ed by requested their rendition. As a general 
rule, where a person performs labor for another 
without the latter' s request, however beneficial 
such labor may be, he cannot recover therefor. 
There is no implied contract to pay for services 
not requested where the person sought to be 
charged made no use thereof." (Emphasis added) 
(See Tilley v Cook County, 103 US 155, 27 L Ed 
374.) 
"The basic principal that a person who officiously 
confers a benefit upon another is not entitled to 
restitution therefor, and the general rule that a 
person who without mistake, coercion, or request 
has unconditionally conferred a benefit upon an-
other is not entitled to restitution . . . " 
In the instant case there was no evidence offered 
by Dugger that any of the specific acts performed by him " 
and testified to by him were requested to be done by Cox. 
In fact, the evidence indicated just the opposite, that Cox 
objected to the services being performed. 
- 15 -
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POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING DUGGERfS LIEN VALID 
BECAUSE THE SAME COVERED EXCESS PROPERTY NOT BENEFITED 
BY THE ALLEGED SERVICES AND MATERIALS FURNISHED BY DUGGER. 
The lien filed by Dugger covered property in excess 
of the property which Dugger claims to have conferred a 
benefit upon by his alleged services and/or materials 
which he claims to have furnished. Dugger's Complaint, 
on its face, states that the lien covered property in excess 
of that which was intended, and said Complaint prays for 
permission to amend said lien. Said permission to amend 
said lien was never granted nor was said lien ever amended. 
Sec. 38-1-4, UCA (1953), Replacement Volume 4, states the 
following: 
"The liens granted by this chapter shall extend 
to and cover so much of the land whereon such 
building structure or improvement shall be made 
as may be necessary for the continuing convenient 
use and occupation thereof." (Emphasis added) 
Thus Dugger is legally bound by his Complaint and 
said Complaint having admitted that the lien covered excess 
property and Dugger having never corrected the same, the 
lien of Dugger is invalid. 
- 16 -
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POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE LIENS OP OTHER 
CREDITORS WERE VALID BECAUSE SAID LIENS WERE NOT FILED 
PURSUANT TO LAW, AND THE ERRORS IN SAID LIENS FURTHER 
SUPPORT COX'S CONTENTION THAT NO AGENCY EXISTED BETWEEN 
COX AND DUGGER AS PER POINT I HEREOF. 
Sec. 38-1-7, UCA (1953), Replacement Volume 4, 
sets forth the requirement and contents of the notice 
to be filed by the lien claimant and states the following: 
". . .every lien shall set forth . . . the name 
of the person by whom he was employed or to 
whom he furnished the material with a state-
ment of the terms, time given and conditions 
of his contract, specifying the time when the 
first and last labor was performed or the first 
and last material was furnished, and also a 
description of the property to be charged with 
a lien sufficient for identification which £laim 
must be verified by oath of himself or some other 
person." (Emphasis added) 
In the instant case# the lien of Towers shows that 
he was contacted by Curtis C. Johnson of Dynatek Enter-
prises, Inc., the lessee of the property and under a verbal 
agreement for time and materials made between the said 
Curtis C. Johnson, Dynatek Enterprises, Inc., on the 9th 
day of May, 1972, through the 8th 'day of June, 1972, 
performed work and Johnson agreed to pay for the same. 
Said lien further shows that Johnson made payments by check 
drawn on bank accounts which contained insufficient funds. 
The lien of Towers is void by reason of the fact that there 
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was no evidence whatsoever put on by Dugger or Towers 
showing that there was any agency relationship between 
Curtis C. Johnson, Dynatek, and Cox, and in order to 
make Towers' lien valid, Plaintiffs must, according to 
Eccles Lumber Co, v Martin, 31 U 241, 87 P 713, have made 
a contract with the owner of the land or his authorized 
agent in order to successfully initiate a lien against the 
owner's real property. This lien being made and filed in 
July of 1972 right at the time that the acts testified by 
all parties was taking place clearly indicates that Dynatek 
Enterprises, Inc., and Curtis C. Johnson were operating 
as lessee out of the subject property, and Dugger was their 
agent. (See also Ellis v Brisacher, 8 U 108, 29 P 879, 
which states that if repairs and improvements are put on 
premises under contract between a contractor and a lessee 
of said premises, then and in that event any liens filed 
against said premises shall be against the interests of 
the leasehold only.) (See also Buehner Block Co. v Glezo, 
6 U 2d 226, 310 P2d 517, which indicates that the lessee 
of real property is an owner within the meaning of the 
Mechanics Lien statute. 
The lien filed by Maxwell is void also for the reason 
as stated heretofore herein and as borne out by the facts 
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that Dugger was in fact not the agent for Cox Corporation, 
and said lien is further faulty by reason of the fact that 
the same shows that the contract was made with J & D 
Enterprises and Dynatek, and that the said J & D Enter-
prises and Dynatek agreed to pay the bill upon completion 
of the contract. Here again the said lien being made and 
filed in May of 1972 at the time the work was being done 
shows that J & D Enterprises was agent for Dynatek and not 
Cox. (Towers1 lien is marked Exhibit ID Towers; Maxwell's 
lien is marked Exhibit 7D Maxwell; and Dugger1s lien is 
marked as Exhibit 22P). 
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POINT V 
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES BECAUSE (1) THE 
LIENS ARE INVALID, AND (2) INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS PRO-
DUCED TO SUPPORT JUDGMENT FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
^ Section 38-1-18, Utah-Code Annotated 1953, i 
Replacement Volume 4, provides 
"In any action brought to enforce any lien 
under this chapter the successful party shall 
be entitled to recover reasonable attorney 
fees to be fixed by the court which shall be 
taxed as cost in the action." 
All parties failed to put on sufficient evidence 
at trial to justify an award of attorney fees. Counsel 
merely asking their clients if a certain amount to be 
charged as and for attorney fees is reasonable, is not 
sufficient evidence for the court to determine the value 
of said fees without knowing the hours, etc. put into said 
case. 
Thus, based upon the evidence before the lower 
court it erred in awarding attorney fees to Dugger and 
the other alleged creditors under the foregoing statute. 
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POINT VI 
THE COURT ERRED IN DECLARING DUGGERfS LIEN VALID BECAUSE 
THE DOLLAR AMOUNT OF SAID LIEN WAS EXCESSIVE 
Section 38-1-25 Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
Replacement Volume 4, provides 
"Any person who knowingly causes to be filed 
for record a claim of lien against any property 
which contains a greater demand than the sum 
due him with the intent to cloud the title, or 
to exact from the owner or person liable by 
means of such excessive claim of lien more than 
is due him or procure any advantage or benefit 
whatever, is guilty of a misdemeanor." 
(Emphasis added) 
In the instant case the lien filed by Dugger is 
excessive as shown by the sums in Appendix A. hereto. 
The excessive amount of Duggerfs lien, along with 
the fact that Dugger without cause or justification liened 
other properties of the defendant Cox Corporation during 
the same period of time, and also made attempts to pur-
chase or lease the subject property, certainly indicate 
that his interests were adverse to the interests of Cox, 
and the act of Dugger in liening the subject property for 
such an excessive amount was in fact an attempt to procure 
an advantage or benefit which, according to the statute, is 
prohibited. 
In Hartford Ace. & Ind. Co. v. Orr (Okla) 321 P2d 
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373, the court held, in construing the statutes such as 
the ones that we have in Utah, that a lien claim is at 
most a tentative charge against property, and that, it 
may be defeated by showing that the indebtedness, or a 
considerable part thereof is not owing. In the instant 
case Dugger in fact admitted that a considerable part of 
his lien which he claimed upon Cox's property was not due 
and owing by his failure to prove the same and by his 
failure to give proper credits to Cox Corporation as 
provided for by the lien statute, and by his further 
failure to deduct liens of others from his lien which 
were filed prior to Dugger's lien, and for his further 
audacity in including liens in lien without the authority 
of other creditors such as Don Hall, all of which make 
Dugger's lien invalid. 
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POINT VII 
THE COURT ERRED IN DECLARING DUGGERfS LIEN VALID BECAUSE 
HE CO-MINGLED NONLIENABLE ITEMS THEREIN 
51 AmJur 2nd, Section 7, P. 149 states, "a lien is 
unenforceable if the notice or claim of lien mingles 
lienable and non-lienable items in unsegregated form", 
and 51 AmJur 2nd Sec, 15, P.154-155 states that a lien 
on property may not be declared as security for a simple 
money claim for services. (See also Jaycox v. Brune [Mo] 
434 SW2d 539) 
51 AmJur 2nd, Section 12, P.152-153 states that 
a "lien cannot be created by a mere volunteer and, as a 
general rule, no lien is created as against an owner of 
property in respect of expenditure upon or liabilities 
incurred in respect of that property by either a stranger 
or a part owner of the property." Here again, Dugger 
being a mere volunteer with regard to his acts upon the 
property in hopes of obtaining something in the future 
for himself cannot bind Cox. 
Section 38-1-3 Utah Code Annotated 1953, Replace-
ment Volume 4, states as follows regarding those who are 
entitled to a lien: "Contractors, subcontractors, and 
all persons performing the labor upon or furnishing 
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materials to be used in the construction or alteration 
of, or addition to, or repair of, any building, structure 
or improvement upon land . . . " are entitled to a lien. 
In the instant case Dugger did not in fact perform any 
labor or furnish any materials to be used in connection 
with said property but merely arranged to have the same 
furnished. The law is clear that a lien may not be de-
clared as security for a simple money claim for services. 
(3ee 51 AmJur 2d, Sec. 15, P. 155,' and Jay cox v. Brune 
[Mo] 434 SW2d 539) Thus Dugger admittedly claimed to 
have furnished services only and therefore he cannot lien 
the property, the courts making a distinction between 
labor upon the property and the mere act of furnishing 
services. 
Many of the items included in Dugger's lien in 
addition to the wages claimed are not lienable items. 
Such other items which are not lienable items are travel 
expenses, cost of materials shipped to other areas and 
used on property such as Richfield and Nephi (See P.106, 
lines 1-30, and P.107, lines 1-30) and various other items 
such as supplies and inventory purchased for resale which 
were shipped to the service station and sold by Dynatek. 
All of the aforesaid items are documented by the evidence 
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submitted by Dugger and are detailed in Appendix B. 
hereto. 
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POINT VIII 
THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED AND NEGLECTED TO MAKE 
ANY RULING WITH REGARD TO THE COUNTERCLAIM OF COX. 
Even though evidence was produced by Cox with regard 
to hi^ Counterclaim, and everl though the same was clearly 
outlined in a Brief to the Lower Court by counsel for Cox, 
the Court failed and neglected to make any ruling thereon, 
therefore, with regard to said Counterclaim, this case 
should be remanded in total to the District Court for 
further proceedings with regard to said Counterclaim's 
validity. 
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POINT IX 
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING A PERSONAL JUDGMENT AND ALSO 
IN DECLARING THE LIEN VALID AND CAUSING THE SAME TO BE 
FORECLOSED 
1
 * In substance and effect the lower court let 
Dugger and the other lien-claimants 'have their cake 
and eat it too1 by awarding both a personal judgment and 
a judgment for a decree of foreclosure allowing the liens 
to be foreclosed• Said creditors either have to have a 
lien or not. If they have a lien that is valid they 
are entitled to attorney fees, and the statute provides 
for a method of foreclosure of same. If they do not 
have a valid lien then they are not entitled to attorney 
fees, but a judgment only. The lower court in granting 
both types of judgment allowed Dugger to encumber numerous 
other properties of Cox prior to foreclosure of his lien 
on the subject property, therefore giving him a decided 
advantage over Cox and any other creditors. 
The lien foreclosure statute does not contemplate 
such an act by the lower court. Section 38-1-15 Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, Replacement Volume 4b, states as follows 
relating to mechanics liens: 
"The court shall cause the property to be 
sold in satisfaction of the liens and costs 
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as in the case of foreclosure of mortgage 
subject to the right of redemption. . ." 
Section 38-1-16 of said Code further provides for 
a deficiency after sale. 
,* Section 78-37-1, Utah .Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, provides as follows: 
"There can be but one action for the recovery 
of any debt or the enforcement of any right 
secured solely by mortgage upon real estate 
which action must be in accordance with the 
provisions of this chapter." 
Thus the lien statute refers to mortgage fore-
closure statute and the mortgage foreclosure statute 
provides for one action, that being a foreclosure action 
and a determination of a deficiency or an overage, and 
the lower court failed to follow the law with regard 
to the same. 
The purpose of such a provision is to compel one 
who claims a security for a debt to exhaust that parti-
cular security before resorting to the general assets 
of the debtor. Such a creditor cannot waive his security 
and sue on a debt. Thus, by reason of said error, this 
case in total should be remanded to the District Court 
for clarification and further proceedings in accordance 
with the law and the statutes as set forth herein. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Cox respectfully 
requests and demands that the judgment of the lower court 
be reversed, that the liens on said property be declared 
void, and that this case be remanded in total to the 
District Court for further proceedings in accordance 
with the laws and statutes as set forth herein. 
DATED this 2nd day of July, 1976. 
fully 
for Appellant-Defendant Cox 
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